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FOURTH AMENDMENT-PROTECTION
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURE
OF THE PERSON: THE NEW(?)
COMMON LAW ARREST TEST
FOR SEIZURE
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In California v. Hodari D., 1 the United States Supreme Court
held that a police pursuit of a fleeing suspect, no matter how threatening, does not amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.2 Under the Court's analysis, the Fourth Amendment does
not become relevant until the suspect submits or is physically
touched by the officer.3 Consequently, evidence a suspect discards
during pursuit is not subject to exclusion at trial as the fruit of a
4
Fourth Amendment seizure.
Upon surveying the Hodari D. opinions, this Note concludes
that the Court's decision calls into question the continuing validity
of the exclusionary rule as a means of deterring improper police
behavior. This Note points out the distinction and contradiction in
logic between Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in Hodari D.
and the Court's earlier opinions governing Fourth Amendment
seizures of persons. Further, this Note delineates the window of opportunity the Court's decision has opened to harrassing police
behavior.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects "[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." ' 5 The ba1 Il

S. Ct. 1547 (1991).

2 Id. at 1549.
3 Id.
4 Id.

5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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sic purpose of this Amendment, "as recognized in countless decisions of [the Supreme] Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
6
officials."
In Boyd v. United States,7 the Supreme Court announced a rule of
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.8 This "exclusionary rule," as it exists today, prohibits the
fruits of an unreasonable search or seizure from being admitted into
evidence in a criminal case.9 The rule is intended to motivate the
law enforcement profession "to adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion of the citizen's constitutional rights."' 10
Although the procedure at issue in Boyd was literally neither a
search nor a seizure," the Court nonetheless found it violated the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.' 2 The Court adhered to a
liberal construction of constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property, stating "a close and literal construction de6 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1966) (citations omitted).
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 Id. at 633. In Boyd, the United States brought criminal charges against an importer
of goods, alleging the use of fraudulent invoices to avoid payment of duties. The Court
held that forcing Boyd to disclose invoices implicated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. Id.
The "exclusionary rule" thus laid down was a product of the interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See id. ("the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is [not] substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself.").
The continued validity of the exclusionary rule announced in Boyd was called into
question in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (fact that papers may have been
illegally taken from the party against whom they are offered is not a valid objection to
their admissibility). However, the rule was reaffirmed in Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (prejudicial error committed where letters and papers, taken from the
accused in violation the Fourth Amendment, were used in evidence over his objection).
9 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
10 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 207, 221 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) ("[T]he Court has examined whether the
rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process."); but see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) ("Regardless of how effective the rule
may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have
no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of
serving some other goal.").
I1 The documents were not seized, but would remain in the defendant's possession
subject to inspection at trial. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 640 (Miller, J., concurring) ("The act is
careful to say that 'the owner of said books and papers, his agent or attorney, shall have,
subject to the order of the court, the custody of them, except pending their examination
in court as aforesaid.' ").
12 Id. at 630.
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prives [those provisions] of half their efficacy, and leads to a gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
3
substance."'
In addition to evidence directly obtained from an illegal search
or seizure, the Court has applied the exclusionary rule to evidence
indirectly, or derivatively, obtained from such invasions.' 4 Writing
for the Court in Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, Justice Holmes
stated, "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all....
[T]he knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be
used by it in the way proposed."' 5 Once the primary illegality is
established, the exclusionary rule will apply to suppress all evidence
obtained as "fruit of th[is] poisonous tree." 16
13 Id. at 635. The Court later repudiated this position in Olmsteadv. New York, stating:
Justice Bradley in the Boyd case ...said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth
Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of
the Constitution in the interest of liberty. But that can not justify enlargement of
the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons,
papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing
or sight.
277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (the Court found that using a wiretap to listen in on telephone
conversations was neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment).
Forty years later, however, the Court renounced the Olmstead "narrow view," finding
it substantially eroded by the Court's subsequent decisions. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
For the continuing validity of this view post-HodariD., see infra text accompanying
notes 85-88.
14 See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (The government
could not make use of information obtained during an unlawful search in order to subpoena from the victims the very documents illegally uncovered); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (Not only were unlawfully intercepted telephone messages
inadmissible, but also the prosecution was not allowed to make use of the information so
obtained).
The exclusionary rule has no application, however, where "the Government learned
of the evidence 'from an independent source,' or the connection between the lawless
conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)
(citing Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392; and Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). The exclusionary rule also is inapplicable where the government would have, without the illegality,
ultimately or inevitably discovered the evidence. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
15 Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
16 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (citing Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). "['ihe exclusionary
sanction applies to any 'fruits' of a constitutional violation- whether such evidence be
tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, items observed or words
overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the
accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention." United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (citations omitted).
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Application of the exclusionary rule thus requires both discovery of a Fourth Amendment violation and determination of the time
at which the violation occurred.' 7 Police activity which does not
amount to a "search" or "seizure," or is not "unreasonable," is unaffected by the exclusionary rule.' 8 Moreover, evidence discovered
prior to a "search" or "seizure" does not come within the purview
of the rule. 19
B.

THE TERRY STOP

Until Teny v. Ohio, 20 the Fourth Amendment proscribed any
seizure of a person that was not justified by the same "probable
cause" showing necessary to make a traditional, "trip to the stationhouse" arrest reasonable. 2 1 In Tery, however, the Supreme
Court "defined a special category of Fourth Amendment 'seizures'
so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule re22
quiring probable cause.., could be replaced by a balancing test."
17 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
18 Id.
19 Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960). Significantly, evidence so discov-

ered may be used in determining whether the eventual "search" or "seizure" was "unreasonable." Id. (the police approached a taxicab and the passenger inside dropped a
package of narcotics; the admissiblity of the evidence turned upon the question of when
the arrest occured); see also Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF L. REV. 399, 417 n.90
(1971) (citing Capitoli v. Wainwright, 426 F.2d 868, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1970), where all
the evidence in a car, except a package thrown from it during the preceding chase was
suppressed).
20 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210-11 (1979).
Either "probable cause" or consent was required to take a person into custody. Id.
"Probable cause" existed if the facts and circumstances before the officer were "such as
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that an offense has been committed." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924). The "probable cause" requirement also applied to searches. Terry, 392 U.S. at 37.
In order to get around this justification requirement police argued that a legal distinction should be made between an investigatory "stop" and an "arrest" ("seizure of
the person"), and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown
search for evidence of a crime. Id. at 10. Police argued that they should be allowed to
"stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning upon suspicion that he may be
connected with criminal activity. Id. Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, they
should have the power to "frisk" him for weapons. Id.
22 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210-11.
The constitutionality of the "stop and frisk" was at issue in Terry. A police officer
observed a group of men he thought intended to rob a store. He approached the men,
identified himself as a police officer, and asked the men their names. When further
questioning failed to dispel his suspicions, the officer grabbed hold of the defendants
and, searching them for weapons, found they were carrying guns. 392 U.S. at 6-7.
The defendants moved to suppress the evidence so discovered as the fruit of an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the "stop"
was an arrest, made without probable cause. The prosecution countered by arguing that
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The Court refused to recognize a "rigid all-or-nothing model of
justification and regulation under the Fourth Amendment. ' 23 In
the Court's view "the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the particular intrusion, in
light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the analy'2 4
sis of reasonableness.
The Court acknowledged that there were limits to its analysis,
however. 2 5 The Court stated, "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons."'2 6 "Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
27
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred."
the officer did not "arrest" the men until after he discovered the weapons. The trial
court denied defendant's motion, and the Supreme Court upheld the denial. Id. at 7-8.
The Court found that the stop and frisk was a search and seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, but that it was justified by the officer's "reasonable suspicion" that
criminal activity was afoot. Id. at 21, 31.
23 Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
24 Id- at 17 n.15. The Court reasoned, "Focusing the inquiry squarely on the dangers
and demands of the particular situation... seems more likely to produce rules which are
intelligible to police and the public alike than requiring the officer in the heat of an
unfolding encounter on the street to make ajudgment as to [whether his conduct meets
a technical definition of 'search,' or 'seizure']." Id "'Search' and 'seizure' are not talismans. We therefore reject the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into
play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something
called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.'" Id. at 19.
In determining whether a seizure or search is "unreasonable" the inquiry is a dual
one- "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." Id at 20-2 1. In balancing the need to search and seize against the intrusion
the procedure entailed in the present case, the Court concluded, where "a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger, the policeman was justified in conducting a limited pat down, or
'frisk' for weapons." l at 27-30.
25 Id. at 21 ("The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when
it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can
be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances.").
26 Id at 19 n.16. Personal intercourse between policemen and citizens that does not
rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure, is consensual, and thus need not be
justified under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (What
began as a consensual conversation in a public place escalated into a seizure when Royer
accompanied police to an interrogation room).
27 Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. Thus, the Court did not rule out the proposition that a
Fourth Amendment seizure may have taken place prior to the "stop and frisk." Id.
Based on the record before it, however, the Court stated "[w]e cannot tell with any
certainty ... whether any such "seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFadden's
initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus
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Justice Stewart elaborated on the level of restraint required for
a seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment in United States v.
Mendenhall.28 Justice Stewart concluded that "a person has been
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave."' 29 The
Court later adopted this approach as the standard to be applied in
0
Fourth Amendment cases.3
In Michigan v. Chesternut,3 1 the Court was presented with the
question whether evidence discarded by a fleeing suspect during a
police pursuit was the fruit of a Fourth Amendment seizure.3 2 Police officers followed the defendant, who picked up his pace upon
seeing them, but they did not use their siren or flashers, command
may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had
occurred." Id.
28 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (police request to see identification and ticket of individual
who stopped upon policemen's approach constituted seizure).
29 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. This is referred to as the "Mendenhall test." While
Justice Stewart announced the opinion of the Court in Mendenhall, the portion of his
opinion which included the Mendenhall test was joined only by then Justice Rehnquist. Id.
Justice Stewart set forth some examples of police conduct which might indicate a
"seizure" under this test: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
compelled." Id. at 554.
30 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (Mendenhalltest not met; posting agents near exits of workplace should not have given respondents, who were otherwise free to continue working and move about, reason to believe that they would be
detained if they refused to respond to questioning); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 50102 (1983) (Mendenhall test met; Royer was unlawfully seized when police officers, who
had possession of his plane ticket, identification and luggage, told him they suspected
him of drug trafficking and asked him to accompany them to an interrogation room).
Before the Mendenhall test was adopted as the standard to be applied, the Court
decided Reid v. Georgia, a case factually similar to HodariD. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438 (1980) (per curiam). In Reid, a DEA agent noticed two men walking through an
airport concourse who met the profile of drug couriers. When the men left the terminal,
the agent approached them, identified himself, and asked them to show him their airline
ticket stubs and identification, which they did. The agent thought the men appeared
nervous during the encounter. The agent asked the men if they would agree to return to
the terminal and consent to a search of their persons and luggage. One nodded his
head, and the other said "yeah, okay." As the three of them entered the terminal, however, one of the men began to run and, before he was apprehended, abandoned his
shoulder bag, which contained cocaine. Id. at 439.
The Court concluded that the facts before the agent were "simply too slender a
reed to support the seizure in this case." Id. at 441. However, the Court did not enunciate at what point the encounter became a "seizure." In concurrence, Justice Powell
stated, "Because we . . . do not consider the initial seizure question in our decision
today, that issue remains open for consideration by the state courts in light of the opinions in Mendenhall." Id. at 443 (Powell, J., concurring).
31 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
32 Id. at 569.
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him to halt or display their weapons.3 3 The officers did not operate
their police car to block the defendant's course, "or otherwise con34
trol the direction or speed of his movement."
Applying the Mendenhall test, the Court found that the police
conduct in question was not a Fourth Amendment seizure, reasoning that it "would not have communicated to a reasonable person an
attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent's freedom
of movement."3 5 The Court refused to adopt a bright line rule that
a police pursuit "is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. '3 6 Instead, the Court adhered to its "traditional contextual approach" of assessing the coercive effect of police conduct,
37
under all the circumstances.
III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 18, 1988, Officers Brian
McColgin and Jerry Pertoso of the Oakland Police Department's
Narcotics Task Force were on patrol, travelling westbound on Foothill Boulevard in an unmarked brown Dodge. 3 8 They were dressed
in street clothes but wearing bluejackets with "police" embossed on
the front and back.3 9 Both officers were familiar with this area because it was reputedly "an area with high narcotic activity." 40 The
41
officers had participated in narcotics arrests in this area before.
As the officers turned south from Foothill onto 63rd, they saw
four or five young black males standing around a red compact car
33 Id.
34 kd
35 Id
36 IL

at 573-74.
at 572. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia in concurrence, would have
adopted the negative perspective. Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
stated, "whether or not the officer's conduct communicates to a person a reasonable

belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate Fourth
Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect."
concurring).

Id. (Kennedy, J.,

37 Id. at 573. Expressing his approval of the Court's focus on the coercive effect of
police conduct, rather than the reaction of the suspect, Professor Wayne LaFave stated:

The "free to leave" concept, in other words, has nothing to do with a particular
suspect's choice to flee rather than submit or with his assessment of the probability
of successful flight. Were it otherwise, police would be encouraged to utilize a very

threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an evidence-gathering technique whenever they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a Tery stop.

3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

§ 9.2 at 61 (1987, Supp. 1991).
38 Joint Appendix at 26-27, California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (No. 891632) [hereinafter Joint Appendix).
39 California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1548 (1991).
40 Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 27-28.
41 Id. at 28.
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which was parked along the curb.4 2 The youths were approximately
forty yards away.4 3 Although the officers did not recognize any of
the individuals, they believed they had interrupted some kind of
narcotic activity. 44 However, neither officer saw any money or drugs
45
being exchanged.
When the youths saw the officers' car approaching, they apparently panicked and took flight. 4 6 Hodari 4 7 and one companion ran
west through an alley to the rear of an abandoned house. 48 The
others fled south. 4 9 The red car also departed south, at a high rate
of speed. 50
Officer McColgin drove the patrol car to the curb where the red
car had been parked. 5 ' Officer Pertoso left the car to give chase on
foot, while McColgin remained in the car and continued south on
63rd. 52 The officers intended to stop the youths and find out what
53
their purpose was for being in the area.
When Pertoso left the car, all of the individuals were out of
sight. 5 4 Pertoso ran to cut them off.55 He went back north on 63rd,
then west on Foothill, and turned south on 62nd Avenue. 5 6 Hodari,
57
meanwhile, emerged from the alley onto 62nd and ran north.
Hodari was looking over his shoulder as he ran, as if to see if someone was following him. 5 8 When he turned and saw Pertoso, Hodari
60
looked startled. 59 They were approximately eleven feet apart.
At this point, "in an underhand scooping motion" Hodari discarded a single loose rock, alongside a house.6 1 A moment later,
Pertoso tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed for assist42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id at 27.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 29; see also id. at 40.
Id. at 28, 43.
California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991).
Hereinafter, the respondent will be referred to as "Hodari," for simplicity.
Joint Appendix, supra note 38, at 39.

49 Id.

50
51
52
53

Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.

54 Id. at 41.

55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.; see also id. at 46.
Id. at 41.
Id.

59 Id. at 46.
60 Id. at 42.
61 Id. at 41-42.

19921

SEIZURE OF THE PERSON

755

ance. 62 Upon searching Hodari, Pertoso found $130 in cash and a
pager. 63 Laboratory analysis determined that the rock Hodari discarded was crack cocaine.64
In the juvenile proceeding brought against him, Hodari moved
to suppress the evideiice relating to the cocaine, as the fruit of an
unlawful seizure of his person. 6 5 The court denied the motion with66
out opinion.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 6 7 The court found
that Hodari had been "seized" when he saw Officer Pertoso running
towards him, 68 that this seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, 69 and that the evidence of the cocaine was the fruit of
the illegal seizure. 70 The court thus held that Hodari's motion was
71
improperly denied at trial.
In concluding that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred,
2
the Court of Appeal utilized the rationale of Michigan v. ChesternutP
The Court of Appeal reasoned that Pertoso's action was "reasonably perceived" as an intrusion upon Hodari's freedom of movement and as "a maneuver intended to block or 'otherwise control
the direction or speed' " of Hodari's movement, and therefore was a
73
Fourth Amendment seizure.
The court rejected the State's contention that "by its citation of
62 Id at 30, 42.
63 Id at 103.
64 Id at 109.
65 Id

66 The California Court of Appeal inferred from the record that the juvenile court's
main concern was "with the nexus between the illegality and the evidence, rather than
the issue of whether there was illegal police conduct." In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr.
79, 81-82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("The [juvenile] court stated: 'I'm not concerned with
the illegality of the chase on these facts. I think this was clearly illegal. The cops had no
reasonable basis for doing what they did in chasing him.' ").
67 Id. at 80.
68 Id- at 83. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's focus on the coercive
effect of police conduct in Michigan v. Chesternut, the Court of Appeal found that since
Hodari had no knowledge of the actions of Officers Pertoso and McColgin between the
time he left their presence and the time he was confronted by Pertoso, the officers' conduct during this interval was irrelevant to its Fourth Amendment analysis. I& (citing
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 n.7 (1988)).
69 Id. at 84. On appeal, the State did not dispute the lower court's finding that the
police had no reasonable cause to chase or detain Hodari. Id. Nonetheless, the Court of
Appeal analyzed the issue and concluded that, "[t]he factors of nighttime, high drug
activity in the area, and seeking to avoid police [by fleeing]" do not constitute "reasonable suspicion" sufficient to justify a seizure. Id. at 84-85.
70 Id. at 86.
71
72
73

Id.
Id. at 83 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575).
Id.
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Hester v. United States 74 in Brower v. County of Inyo 75 , a civil rights case,
the Supreme Court had adopted the suggestion of two justices in
Chesternut that there can be no detention until a fleeing suspect is
actually caught."' 7 6 The court reasoned that if the statement of
those justices "refer[red] to a requirement of physical restraint, it
would be contrary to many years of Supreme Court precedent stating that no physical restraint is necessary to constitute a
detention."77
Even if physical seizure were required, the court concluded, the
confrontation between Hodari and Officer Pertoso was tantamount
to a physical seizure. The court reasoned that "[Hodari], who was
running down the sidewalk, had his physical freedom of movement
sufficiently blocked by the presence of a police officer, wearing a
jacket marked 'police' who was eleven feet away and running to78
wards him."
The California Supreme Court denied the State's application
for review. 79 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had
80
been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
74 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the defendant was under surveillance as a result of
an informant's tip. Officers saw the defendant hand an accomplice a quart bottle, at
which point an "alarm" was given, and the two men fled. An officer pursued, and the
two men dropped bottles, which the officers recognized as containing illegal whiskey.
The Court of Appeal distinguished Hester:
It appears from these facts that the officers in Hester had at least a reasonable suspicion, having lawfully witnessed the transaction with the bottles, which would have
justified a detention prior to defendant's flight. The case has no application to illegal detentions, nor does it purport to define what constitutes a detention, but
merely states that there was no seizure when the officers inspected the bottles.
In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
75 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
76 In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy,J.,
concurring, joined by Scalia, J.)).
77 Id. at 83 n.3 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (involuntary
rolling down of vehicle window in response to officer's request denoted a "forcible
stop"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) ("[o]nly when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.") (emphasis supplied)).
The Court of Appeal also cited California and federal cases which held that "giving
chase 'in a manner designed to overtake and detain or encourage the individual to give
up his flight is a detention.' " In re Hodari D., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (citing People v.
Washington, 236 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. App. 1987); People v. Menifee, 160 Cal. Rptr. 682
(Cal. App. 1979); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980)).
78 Id at 84 n.4.
79 In re Hodari D., 1990 Cal. LEXIS 1302 (1990). At the same time, the California
Supreme Court ordered the decision of the Court of Appeal withdrawn from official
publication. Id.
80 California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991). Petitioner, State of Califor-
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THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California
Court of Appeal. 8 ' Writing for the majority,8 2 Justice Scalia concluded that although the police pursuit may have constituted a
"show of authority" enjoining Hodari to stop, Hodari was not
"seized" until physically apprehended, because he did not submit to
that injunction. 83 Thus, the Court held that evidence abandoned
during the pursuit was not the fruit of a Fourth Amendment seizure,
and Hodari's motion to suppress this evidence was properly denied
84
at trial.
The majority based its conclusion on the dictionary definition
and common law usage of the word "seizure." 8 5 The Court stated
that "[firom the time of the founding to the present, the word
'seizure' has meant a 'taking possession.' "186 Further, "[flor most
purposes at common law, the word connoted not merely grasping
or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in
question, but actually bringing it within physical control."8 7 Where,
as here, the arrester did not actually bring his object within physical
control, therefore, the Court concluded that there was no seizure. 88
As a policy matter, the Court reasoned that because street purnia, conceded that the officer did not have a "reasonable suspicion" to seize Hodari
when the pursuit began. Id. at 1549 n.1.
The order granting certiorari is published at lII S. Ct. 38 (1991).
81 HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
82 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter joined Justice Scalia.
83 Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. at 1552.
The majority accepted as true, without deciding, that the police pursuit amounted
to a "show of authority" as soon as Hodari saw the officer nearly upon him. Id. at 1550
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
The majority did not decide whether the police had "reasonable suspicion" to stop
Hodari when the pursuit began, choosing instead to rely on the State's concession that
they did not. Id. at 1549 n.l. The majority stated however, "That it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sighting of
the police is not self-evident, and arguably contradicts proverbial common sense." Id.
(citing Proverbs 28:1, "The wicked flee when no man pursueth").
84 Id at 1549.
85 1&
86 Id- (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
67 (1828); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAw DICTIONARY 510 (6th ed. 1856); WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2057 (1981)).
87 Id. at 1549-50 (citing Pelham v. Rose, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 103, 106 (1870) ("A res
capable of manual delivery was not seized until 'taken into custody.' ")).
88 Id. at 1550 (the word seizure "does not remotely apply ... to the prospect of a
policeman yelling 'Stop, in the name of the law!' at a fleeing form that continues to
flee.").
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suits always place the public at some risk, compliance with police
orders to stop should be encouraged.8 9 Moreover, the Court argued that its decision would not alter police expectations. 90 Since
police do not attempt to stop suspects expecting them to get away,
the Court explained, "it fully suffices to apply the exclusionary rule
to their genuine successful seizures."91
The majority acknowledged the "principle" that all common
law arrests are seizures,9 2 but rejected suggestion that Officer
Pertoso's "uncomplied-with show of authority" was a common law
arrest. 9 3 The Court explained that in order to constitute an arrest at
common law, the arrestee either had to submit to, or be physically
touched by, the person making the arrest. 9 4 Without either submission or touching, however, there could be no arrest and thus no
Fourth Amendment seizure. 95
Because Hodari did not submit when confronted by the officer,
and because there was no physical contact between the officer and
Hodari during the chase, the Court concluded that the officer did
not seize Hodari until he tackled him. 96 Moreover, since "'[a]

seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact,' " even if "Pertoso
had laid his hands upon Hodari to arrest him," if "Hodari had bro89 Id. at 1551.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.

The Court did not cite authority for this "principle," which is apparently first
enunciated here.
93 Id.
94 Id.

A common law arrest was predicated on either "actual" or "constructive" seizure of
the arrestee. Horace L. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541, 553

(1924).
An "actual" seizure, or detention, was accomplished by physical control, taking possession, or laying on of hands, which subjected the arrestee to actual control. Id. Actual
seizure also arose from "a surrender or yielding upon demand, to immediately apprehended coercion, rather than resisting it." Id. However, words indicating an arrest
without submission by the arrestee were not sufficient. Id. (footnote ommitted).
A "constructive" seizure was accomplished "by merely touching, however slightly,
the body of the accused, by the party making the arrest and for that purpose, although
he [did] not succeed in stopping or holding him even for an instant." ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930) (footnote omitted); Wilgus,
supra this note, at 556 (citing Whitehead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. 495 (1862); Genner v.
Sparkes, I Salk. 79, 6 Mod. 173 (1704) (where the bailiff had tried to arrest one who
fought him off by a fork, the court said, "if the bailiff had touched him, that had been an
arrest."); People v. McLean, 68 Mich. 480 (arrest occurred where officer laid his hand on
the shoulder of the accused and pronounced words of arrest, despite the fact that immediately thereafter the accused pulled a revolver and forced his way free)).
95 HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 (citing Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L.
REV. 201, 206 (1940)).
96 Id.
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ken away and [] then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say that disclosure had been made during the course of an
97
arrest."
The majority replied to the dissent's contention that Supreme
Court jurisprudence, beginning with Katz v. United States,98 had "unequivocally reject[ed] the notion that the common law defines the
limits of the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment." 9 9 The majority explained that it did not assert that under the Fourth Amendment the common law "defines the limits of the term 'seizure'; only
that it defines the limits of a seizure of the person."'10 0 Thus, the majority maintained that its reasoning was consistent with Katz: "What
Katz stands for is the proposition that items which could not be subject to seizure at common law (e.g. telephone conversations) can be
seized under the Fourth Amendment. That is quite different from
saying that what constitutes an arrest (seizure of the person) has
changed."'01
The majority rejected the dissent's contention that the Court's
decision in Tery v. Ohio 10 2 broadened the range of encounters encompassed within the term "seizure."' 1 3 Terry, the Court stated,
"unquestionably involved conduct that would constitute a commonlaw seizure; its novelty (if any) was in expanding the acceptablejusti04
fication for such a seizure, beyond probable cause."'
In accordance with this position, the majority interpreted the
Mendenhall test to be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for
the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. 10 5 Because
this test was worded "only if" rather than "whenever," the majority
reasoned that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not automatically
result from a police "show of authority" which the subject reasonably believes is intended to restrict her freedom. 10 6 Rather, a sus10 7
pect must submit to this authority in order to be "seized."'
Finding the Mendenhall test met during pursuit, therefore, was perfectly consistent with finding that seizure did not occur until after
97
98
99

Id at 1550 (citing Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 471 (1874)).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
HodariD., I IIS. Ct. at 1551 n.3 (citing Hodari D., I IIS. Ct. at 1555 (Stevens,J,

dissenting)).
100 Id.
101 Id.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 n. 3 (citingHodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1555 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
102
103

104 Id.
105 Id
106 ld.

107 Id.

at 1551.
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the pursuit ended.' 0 8
The majority found Michigan v. Chesternut' 0 9 and Brower v.
County of Inyo 110 consonent with its approach.' I I The majority reasoned that since the Mendenhall test was not met in Chesternut,11 2 the
Court in that case did not reach the question whether a police pursuit, in and of itself, could constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.' 13 The majority found persuasive the fact that the Court in
Brower did not consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during the course of a twenty mile police chase.' '4 The majority reasoned that was because that twenty mile "show of
authority" did not produce a stop."15
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens" 1 6 strongly objected to
the majority's literal interpretation of the language of the Fourth
Amendment, stating that it broke sharply from a long line of cases
which had rejected this analysis. 1 7 Further, the dissent rejected the
majority's reliance on the common law of arrest to define the limits
of the seizure of a person. 18 Finally, Justice Stevens denounced the
majority's focus on the reaction of the citizen, rather than the egregious police conduct, in defining the timing of a seizure. 1 19
The dissent asserted that beginning with Katz v. United States,
0
the Court abandoned a literal reading of the Fourth Amendment.12
Instead, the Court adopted a position of applying the safeguards of
the Fourth Amendment to "all evils that are like and equivalent to
108 Id. at 1552.
109 486 U.S. 567 (1980). See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
110 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (collision between Brower's car and police roadblock was a
seizure).
I1I Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
112 Id. The police cruiser's slow following of the suspect did not convey the message
that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his business. Chesternut, 486
U.S. at 573. See infra text accompanying notes 171-73.
113 HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1552.
114 Id. (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 597).
115 Id.
116 Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Marshall.
117 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 11-13 and
accompanying text.
118 Id. at 1556-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
Katz involved electronic surveillance conducted "without any trespass and without the
seizure of any material object." The Court concluded that such electronic eavesdropping is a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Constitution. 389 U.S. at 35354; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words." 1 21 The
Court in Katz specifically held that the Fourth Amendment extended
to processes which could not have been the subject of a commonlaw seizure. 122

Soon thereafter, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court expanded the acceptable justification for a seizure of a person from probable cause
to reasonable suspicion. 12 3 Justice Stevens explained that "[a]s a
corollary to the lesser justification for a stop, the Court [in Terry]
necessarily concluded that the word "seizure" in the Fourth Amendment encompassed official restraints on individual freedom that fall
short of a common-law arrest."' 124 The majority's emphasis on Hester v. United States, decided over forty years before Terry, was there12 5
fore misplaced.
Moreover, the dissent argued, the majority's "novel conclusion" that actual control is required for a seizure of a person makes
the Court's discussions of whether the Mendenhall test was met in
12 6
cases where no actual control was imposed seriously misleading.
The dissent acknowledged that the officer's attempt to take
Hodari into custody was not a common law arrest. 12 7 The dissent
121 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(Butler, J., dissenting)).
122 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353-54).
123 Id at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968)).
124 Id at 1555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Teny, 392 U.S. at 19). In further support of his position that a seizure of a person who refuses to submit to a show of authority requires something less than a physical touching, Justice Stevens cited United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984):
While the concept of a "seizure" of property is not much discussed in our cases, this
definition follows from our oft-repeated definition of the "seizure of a person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment- meaningful interference, however
brief, with an individual's freedom of movement. (citations omitted).
125 Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1555 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)).
126 Id. at 1557 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984)).
The dissent also pointed out that the majority's focus on the suspect's reaction as
opposed to the policeman's conduct, was the exact argument that was rejected by the
Court in Chesternut:
Petitioner argues that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual
stops in response to the police's show of authority. Thus, petitioner would have us
rule that a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police
conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually
apprehending the individual.
Id. at 1558 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
572 (1980)). The Court in Chesternut decided to adhere to its "traditional contextual
approach" in determining whether a seizure had occurred. Id at 1558 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573).
127 Id. at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that if the officer had succeeded in touching Hodari before he dropped the rock (assuming the touching precipi-
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pointed out, however, that such an attempt was unlawful at common
law. 1 28 The dissent noted the irony "in the fact that the Court's own
justification for its result is its analysis of the rules of the common
law of arrest that antedated our decisions in Katz and Terry. Yet,
even in those days the common law provided the citizen with protec29
tion against an attempt to make an unlawful arrest."'
Justice Stevens condemned the majority's decision to remove
from scrutiny the interval of time between the officer's show of authority and complete submission by the citizen.' 30 During this interval, Justice Stevens explained, evidence could be discovered which
would make a seizure, initiated unreasonably, reasonable.' 3 ' Thus,
police would " 'be encouraged to utilize a very threatening but sufficiently slow chase as an evidence-gathering technique whenever
they lack even the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop.' "132
The dissent argued that the ends the Court sought to achieve in
denying suppression of the evidence in this case would have been
better served by enlarging the scope of reasonable justification,
rather than narrowing the definition of a seizure.' 3 3 Placing police
conduct beyond scrutiny, the dissent argued, contradicts the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and Fourth Amendment prohibitions,
34
to deter improper police behavior.'
V.

California v.

Hodari D.135

ANALYSIS

represents the culmination of a strug-

tated the abandonment), the evidence would have been the fruit of an unlawful common
law seizure. But see supra text accompanying note 97 (if Pertoso had laid his hands upon
Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and had then cast away the cocaine, it
would hardly be realistic to say that that disclosure had been made during the course of
an arrest).
128 HodariD., Ill S. Ct. at 1553 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Perkins, supra note 95,
at 201 n.3, "[A]n officer might be guilty of an assault because of an attempted arrest,
without privilege, even if he did not succeed in touching the other. Furthermore, if the
other submitted to such an arrest without physical contact, the officer is liable for false
imprisonment." (citation omitted)).
129 Id. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's decision, Justice Stevens argued, thus
distinguishes "show of authority" seizures from physical force seizures, and all searches,
which need to be justified at their inception. Id. at 1560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 3 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.2 at 61).
133 Id. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority's decision to apply a rigid test will not reduce litigation in this area: "The range of possible
responses to a police show of force, and the multitude of problems that may arise in
determining whether, and at what moment, there has been "submission," can only create uncertainty and generate litigation." Id. at 1560 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'35 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
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gle between two factions of the Supreme Court. 3 6 One group, including Justices Scalia and Kennedy, has been intimating its stance
on the issue presented in HodariD. for several years.' 3 7 Until now,
38
their position has been relegated to dicta and separate opinions.'
In Hodari D., however, their position not only prevailed, but prevailed handily.' 3 9 Writing for a seven member majority, Justice
Scalia concluded that a police "show of authority" which is unheeded by a suspect does not amount to a seizure of the person for
40
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court thus refined its analysis of Teny v. Ohio and its progeny. 14 1 There remain, under these cases, two categories of Fourth
Amendment seizures: those based upon physical force and those
based on an official show of authority. 14 2 Under Justice Scalia's approach in Hodari D., however, the Court limited the reach of the
show of authority category. 143 An official show of authority, which
an individual reasonably believes is intended to restrict her freedom
of movement, and which meets the Mendenhall test, 144 does not
amount to a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes unless and
14 5
until that individual submits.
The Court justified this position by appealing to the "principle," apparently first enunciated here, that the common law of
arrest defines the limits of the seizure of a person under the Fourth
Amendment. 14 6 By so doing, however, the Court expanded the
physical force category of Fourth Amendment seizures.' 4 7 A common law arrest, and now a Fourth Amendment seizure, results from
136 See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (opinion by ScaliaJ.)
("Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires intentional acquisition of physical control."); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 577 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It
is at least plausible to say that whether or not the officer's conduct communicates to a
person a reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect.");
compare with Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-73 (opinion by Blackmun, J.) (Court refused to
adopt a rule that "a lack of particularized suspicion would not poison police conduct, no
matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the
individual.").
137 See supra note 136.
138 Id

139 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1547.
140 Id.
141 See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.

142 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); see also supra text accompanying note
27.
143 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
144 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
145 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1550.
146 Id. at 1550-51.
147 See ic at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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physical contact, however slight, between the person arresting and
the person arrested, for the purpose of the arrest.1 48 Thus while
control over a subject is required for a show of authority seizure, it
14 9
is not required for a physical force seizure.
In Brower v. County of Inyo, writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
announced that "[v]iolation of the Fourth Amendment requires an
intentional acquisition of physical control."' 50 In Hodari D., however, Justice Scalia stated that in order to determine whether a
Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred one may simply "appea[l]
to the principle that all common law arrests are seizures."' 5 ' Since
an arrest at common law did not require the acquisition of physical
control, Justice Scalia's reasoning in Hodari D. contradicts his rea15 2
soning for the Court in Brower.
The outcomes of Brower and Hodari, however, are unchanged
under either analysis. The police officer exercised control over
Hodari when he tackled him.' 5 3 The police made physical contact
with Brower when his car collided with the roadblock they set up to
stop him.15 4 The decision in Brower did not turn on the question of
physical control. 155
The question before the Court in Brower concerned the relationship between police activity and the termination of a subject's
movement, that is necessary to constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.' 56 The County of Inyo argued that the police intended to
stop the defendant only by show of authority, by pursuit and by setting up a roadblock in his path. 15 7 The defendant's crashing into
the roadblock, the County argued, was an accidental effect of otherwise lawful police activity and thus was not a Fourth Amendment
58
seizure.'1
After surveying the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that a seizure occurs whenever a person
is "stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place
in order to achieve that result."' 59 The subjective intentions of the
148 Id.
149 See

at 1550; see supra note 94-95 and accompanying text.
id..

150 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
151 HodariD., 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
152 Id. This is under "physical force" branch of the Fourth Amendment seizure of the
person. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
153 Hodari D., i11 S.Ct. at 1549.

154 Brower, 489 U.S. at 594.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 596-97.
157
158

Id. at 597.
Id. at 595-96.

159 Id.
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police were therefore irrelevant.' 60
At common law, an arrest occurred whenever police made
61
physical contact with a suspect for the purpose of arresting him.'
Therefore, since a common law arrest resulted when the defendant
collided with the roadblock, Brower could have been decided by simply "appealing to the principle that all common law arrests are
seizures."' 162 The Court's discussion of the history of the Fourth
16 3
Amendment was "at best, seriously misleading."'
Necessary to sustain the Court's conclusion that the common
law of arrest defines the limits of Fourth Amendment seizures, is the
premise that the Mendenhall test was meant as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a show of authority seizure.1 64 For, if meeting the Mendenhall test were all that was required for a Fourth
Amendment seizure in these instances (i.e. submission was not also
required), then the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amend165
ment would be a broader notion than the common law arrest.
The Court found the existence of this premise exemplified by Brower
1 66
and Michigan v. Chesternut.
The Court found significant the fact that it was not discussed in
Brower whether a Fourth Amendment seizure could have occurred
during the course of a twenty mile police chase.' 6 7 The Court reasoned that was because that "show of authority did not produce a
stop.' ' 168 The Court's emphasis on Brower is inappropriate, howId.
161 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 94 (a common law arrest occurs when there is the intentional application of physical force for the purpose of arrest).
163 See California v. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1557 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Brower, 489 U.S. at 595-97.
164 See Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1550.
165 See supra note 94.
166 Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1551-52 (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 and Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
The Court based this premise not only on the common law of arrest, but also the
language of the Mendenhall test itself. Id. at 1550. The Court found especially persuasive the fact that the Mendenhall test was worded so that an individual is seized "only if"
the test was met, rather than an individual is seized "whenever" the test was met. Id. at
1551. Lower courts did not so interpret these words. See, e.g., In re DJ., 532 A.2d 138,
140 (D.C. 1987) (commencement of police pursuit was a seizure for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment under Mendenhall test); People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451 (Mich.
1985) (same).
It can be legitimately argued, however, that the Court has not yet decided a case in
which police conduct met the Mendenhall test, but the subject did not submit. See Hodari
D., 111 S.Ct. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the facts of this case are somewhat
unusual"); but see Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
167 Id. at 1552 (citing Brower, 489 U.S. at 597).
160

168 Id.
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ever. Brower was a civil rights case, in which damages were sought
for an unreasonable seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment. 6 9 The "unreasonableness" was not the chase of Brower,
who was fleeing police in a stolen car, but rather the erection of a
police roadblock around a blind comer, and then shining a light in
170
Brower's face so he could not see the roadblock in time to stop.
The Court also found significant its perception that the question of whether a police pursuit could constitute a seizure was not
reached in Chesternut.17 1 As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent,
however, the Court in Chesternut rejected the proposition that a police pursuit can never constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. 17 2 In
finding that there was no seizure in Chesternut, the Court relied on
the fact that the police officers did not harass the defendant, not that
the defendant did not submit, which would have ended the matter
without discussion under the "necessary, but not sufficient"
173
approach.
The most troubling aspect of the decision in Hodari D., however, is the Court's conclusion that its decision will have no effect on
police behavior. 174 The Court erroneously concluded that "unlawful [police] orders [to "stop"] will not be deterred, [] by sanctioning
through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed....
[I]t fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine successful
seizures."'175 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated "we must
presume that only a few of those orders will be without adequate
basis" and that "policemen do not command 'Stop!' expecting to be
17 6
ignored, or give chase hoping to be outrun."'
The Court did not base its presumptions on a belief in the good
faith of policemen. The Court previously rejected "good faith" as a
justification for declining to apply the exclusionary rule. 177 Because
police are engaged in "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
169 Brower, 489 U.S. at 594.
170 Id.
171 See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572-73 ("Rather than adopting either rule proposed by

the parties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual approach, and
determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not
amount to a seizure.").
172 Id.
173 See id. at 573-76.
174 See HodariD., I IIS. Ct. at 1551.
175 Id. This is, of course, not because the Court has defined as lawful police orders
made without adequate justification which are not obeyed.
176 Id.
177 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
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out crime," 17 8 " 'good faith on the part of the arresting officers is
not enough.' If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only
79
in the discretion of the police."'
The Court offered no explanation or justification for its presumptions and thus presumed too much. By presuming that the police only make a few orders to stop without adequate basis, the
Court presumed that its decision reached only a limited number of
cases. By presuming that police cannot be influenced to make orders which they expect will be disobeyed (which would seem a logical result of not applying the exclusionary rule), 18 0 the Court
presumed that its decision will have no effect on police behavior. By
therefore presuming, hysteron proteron, the conclusion it set out to
prove, the Court argued circuitously. The Court began and ended
its argument with the bald assertion that the remedial objectives of
the exclusionary rule would not be served by applying the rule to
deliberate, but unsuccessful, attempts to violate the Fourth
Amendment.
A better reasoned approach to the question of whether to apply
the exclusionary rule centers on the extent to which the remedial
objectives of the rule would be served.'18 Because of the substantial
social costs of excluding highly probative and "inherently trustworthy" evidence, "the application of the rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most effica82
ciously served."'
Without perfect information regarding police-citizen encounters, not all violations of the Fourth Amendment will be discov84
ered and sanctioned. 8 3 Where the probability of benefit
outweighs the probability of sanction, police will have an incentive
to attempt to violate the Fourth Amendment. 8 5 Refusing to sanc178

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).

179 Beck, 379 U.S. at 97 (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)).
180 See infra notes 189-209 and accompanying text.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1983).
Id. at 905-08 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
See generally Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 435, 440-44 (1990).
184 Of course, evidence of guilt will not always be revealed when police violate the
Fourth Amendment.
185 This follows the "standard model of deterrence." See Shavell, supra note 183, at
436-37. Of course, the mere fact that police have an incentive to violate the Fourth
Amendment, does not mean that they will, in actuality, do so. Indeed, empirical studies
have questioned the effect the exclusionary rule has on police behavior. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
181
182
183
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tion unsuccessful attempts will further reduce the probability of
186
sanction and add to this incentive.
The Court in HodariD. argued, however, that because police do
not attempt to stop suspects with an eye toward failure, this added
incentive will not result in more attempts, and more harrassing police behavior.' 8 7 Because expectations are ultimately tied to
probabilities, however, this logic fails close inspection.188
If the probability of sanction declines, the probability of benefit
will outweigh the probability of sanction more often than before,
and police will engage in more attempts to violate the Fourth
Amendment. 18 9 Further, because an attempt alone may result in the
subject abandoning incriminating evidence, police may make attempts with the intention of failure. 190 Where the police are able to
control, or effectively predict the suspect's response, these attempts
(citing Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.

665, 667 (1970)); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 1.2 at 25-28. However, the
Supreme Court has retained the exclusionary rule for the sole purpose of deterring improper police behavior. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984). Ignoring this purpose casts doubt upon the rule's legitimacy. The discussion that follows assumes that
the Court is not abandoning, sub silentio, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
186 Shavell, supra note 183, at 436. The amount of the reduction will depend on the
probability that an unsuccessful attempt will be discovered and sanctioned. Id. at 447.
If the probability is very low, the reduction may be minimal. Id.
187 California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991) ("Unlawful orders will not
be deterred... by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule, those of them that are not
obeyed. Since policemen do not command 'Stop!' expecting to be ignored, or give
chase hoping to be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures.").
188 See generally Stephen Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty
and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721 (1989).
189 See Shavell, supra note 183, at 436 (punishing attempts increases deterrence by
raising the probability of imposing sanctions). Because the magnitudes of benefit (admission of the evidence discovered) and sanction (suppression of the evidence discovered) are equal in this situation, the probabilities of benefit and sanction will determine
whether the police attempt to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 439-40.
Following the Court's statement regarding the good faith of policemen, supra note
177, this argument disregards conscience as a motivating factor in police activity.
Rather, the argument assumes, as does any argument of deterrence, the presence of
rational actors. Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in
Ciminology: The Path Not Taken, 81J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 (1990). Rational
actors are informed by the probable consequences of their actions and seek to maximize
benefit and minimize burden. Id. at 654.
190 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 3 LAFAVE, supra note
37, § 9.2 at 61).
Police would not actually intend to fail, but rather to "strategically abandon" the
attempt if it did not yield evidence of guilt. See Shavell, supra note 183, at 446 (strategic
abandonment occurs when a person desists from proceeding with an attempt upon noticing that the chances of being discovered and sanctioned now outweigh the chances of
benefit).
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may become a common investigative technique. 19 '

The police may begin such a hypothetical encounter by approaching an individual in a public place.' 92 If the individual stops
in response to police inquiries, he has consented to the encounter.1 93 Complying with a request does not constitute a common law
arrest (Fourth Amendment seizure). 9 4 Evidence obtained as the
fruit of a consensual encounter is not subject to the exclusionary
rule. 9 5 Only when police behavior rises to the level of an official
"show of authority" does submission complete a seizure rather than
1
indicate consent.

96

One jurisdiction's case law demonstrates how difficult this important factual determination can be.' 9 7 Interpreting the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, District of Columbia courts have
held that no seizure occurred when police called to an individual,
"Police. Wait a second. We want to talk to you."' 9 8 Seizure occurred, however, when police called, "Come here, police
officers."1 9 9
Continuing the hypothetical, if the individual declines the po191 See 3 LAFAvE, supra note 37, § 9.2 at 61.
192 For a pre-HodariD. analysis of the same factual context, see Mascolo, supra note 19,
at 415-417.
193 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1982); cf.Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S 438, 439, 441
(1980) (per curiam) (DEA agent asked if defendants would agree to return to airport
terminal and to consent to a search of their persons and their shoulder bags. One defendant nodded affirmatively and the other said "yeah, okay." The Court determined
that there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion "to support the seizure in this
case."). Shavell, supra note 183, at 438.
The hypothetical that follows is based on the premise that the individual does not
wish to comply with the police. Contrary to the Court's statement in Hodari D., such a
desire may not stem from a guilty conscience, but rather a fear of unjustified harrassment. See Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The presumption
should be for the latter, until it can be empirically proven that all such desires stem from
a guilty conscience. See Ker et ux. v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (presumption that only those who are in fact guilty will forcibly resist arrest
does violence to the presumtion of innocence in criminal cases); but see HodariD., 111 S.
Ct. at 1549 n.1; Proverbs 28:1 ("The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the riteous
are bold as a lion.").
194 Wilgus, supra note 94, at 555 (citing Arrowsmith v. LeMesurier, 2 Bos. & P.N.P.
211, per Lord Mansfield, criticized by Miller, J., in Warner v. Riddiford, 4 Com. B.N.S.
205) (going voluntarily to the magistrate after the officer showed the accused he had a
warrant for his arrest was not such a detention as to constitute an arrest).
195 Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
196 Id. (the Mendenhall test represents the point at which police conduct has become so
harrassing as to indicate seizure rather than consent).
197 See EdwinJ. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures, 79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 450, 456
n.109 (comparing Richardson v. United States, 520 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C. 1987) with
Johnson v. United States, 468 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1983)).
198 Richardson, 520 A.2d at 697.
199 Johnson, 468 A.2d at 1327.
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lice invitation to stop and answer questions, the police may follow
him. 20 0 Evidence obtained as a result of following is not subject to
20
the exclusionary rule. '
If the individual then picks up his pace, the police may step up
their pursuit. 20 2 The police may chase the individual, 20 3 run headlong at him, 20 4 or fire rounds of gunfire by his head. 20 5 The Fourth
Amendment will not come into play unless and until he submits or is
physically apprehended. 20 6 Any evidence abandoned during such a
20 7
chase is not subject to the exclusionary rule.

It is unavailing to the individual being pursued that the police
conduct is threatening enough to convey to a reasonable person
that he was not free to disregard the police and continue on his way.
An individual is no longer free to ignore the police as he would anyone else met on the street. 208 The effect of HodariD. is that an individual must stop and respond to questions whenever posed by
20 9
police.
200 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (following is not considered a
sufficient "show of authority" to indicate a seizure).
If an individual decides to "willfully elude or flee a police officer after receiving a
visual or audible signal from the officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop," he has
committed a crime in twenty-one states. Brief for the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Lousiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae at
10 n.4, Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (No. 86-1824). In those situations,
it has been argued that a police order to stop, in and of itself, is a "seizure." The Court
was not presented with this situation in Chesternut or HodariD., and has not ruled on this
issue.
201 Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573.
202 California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 (1991).
The proposition that unprovoked flight provides the police with reasonable suspicion to detain has not been tested as of yet. This proposition has, however, found support with certain members of the Court. See id. at 1558 n.I (Opinion by Scalia, J.) ("The
wicked flee when no man pursueth"); see also Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("respondent's unprovoked flight gave the police ample cause to stop
him").
203 HodariD., 1I1 S. Ct. at 1550.
204 Id.
205 Id.

at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Hoffman v. Ruesch, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13701 (6th Cir. 1991).
206 HodariD., Ill S. Ct. at 1550.
207 Id.
208 Cf Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 49, 53 (1979) ("In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant's
right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police
interference.").
209 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1551 ("Only a few of those orders, we must presume, will
be without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of identifying
the deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course to comply.").
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As a policy matter, the overarching issue presented in HodariD.
was whether the exclusionary rule should apply to deliberate police
action which but-for the uncooperative nature of the suspect would
be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court simply was willing to allow a suspect's fear of unlawful police activity
defeat his claim based on that activity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In California v. Hodari D., the Supreme Court concluded that
harrassing police conduct which does not immediately yield a stop,
but which prompts an individual to reveal what would otherwise be
impermissible for the police to seek by means of a search of his person is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.2 1 0 In determining
whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, a reviewing
court must focus not only on the harrassing police behavior, but
21 1
also on the initial reaction of the suspect.
If the suspect does not immediately yield to police overtures,
the police may institute a progression of procedures, designed to
control the reaction of the suspect while prodding him toward selfincrimination. If the suspect does immediately yield, then he has
arguably consented to the encounter. Either way, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment are not implicated and the exclusionary rule
does not apply.
Under HodariD., police are permitted to stray from "the legitimate investigative sphere" 2 12 without risk of sanction.2 13 Allowing
police this freedom is a departure from "courts' traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or
harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the ob214
jective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires."
Commentators asked courts to be "suspicious of police-citizen
encounters that result in 'abandonment' of incriminating evidence.
These [abandonments] are sometimes the intended purposes of ingenious 'investigatory' schemes between fellow officers." 2 15 In210 Id. at 1550. The police may thus do "indirectly what is denied them directly." See

Mascolo, supra note 19, at 419; cf Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (The
basis of the exclusionary rule is that the government may not do indirectly, through
violation of the Fourth Amendment, what is denied it directly through the Fifth
Amendment).
211 Id

212 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
213 HodariD., 111 S.Ct. at 1553 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Terny, 392 U.S. at 15 ("When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by
the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.").
215 Alexander E. Eisemann, Addressing the Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police
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stead, the Court in Hodari D. gave police considerable freedom to
intrude on an individual's privacy in order to advance these "abandonments," and to stop without reasonable cause those they wish to
21 6
question.
TIMOTHY

J.

DEVETSKI

Motivation in EstablishingFourth Amendment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REv. 223, 278 (1983) (citing Massachusetts v. Painten, 368 F.2d 142, 143 (1st Cir. 1966) (police officers, making
visit to defendant's apartment on pretext of routine investigation, stationed one officer
in back of building to prevent escape; evidence that defendant "abandoned" in response
to police knock, in view of that officer, was suppressed), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 560
(1968)); Mascolo, supra note 19, at 415; 3 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 9.2 at 61.
216 Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's immediate
concern with containing criminal activity poses a substantial, though unintended, threat
to values that are fundamental and enduring.").

